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EXTENDED AFFECTIVITY AS 
THE COGNITION OF PRIMARY 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY1
abstract
I discuss the primordial affectivity approach (Colombetti 2014) and the extended emotions theory 
(Krueger 2014, Slaby 2014, Candiotto 2015, Carter et al. 2016) in order to propose a novel account of 
“extended affectivity” (EA) as the cognition of primary intersubjectivity (EACPI). I explain why the 
distributed cognition model is the more convenient to understand the collective and the subjective 
dimension of EA. The novelty of EACPI consists in the recognition of the protocognitive valence of the 
affectivity, referring to the work of Colwin Trevarthen (Trevarthen 1979; Trevarthen 2011), who has 
demonstrated the leading role of affectivity in the neonatal intersubjectivity in neurobiology.
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Among the many novel ongoing approaches in the contemporary debate about the nature 
of emotions, the primordial affectivity approach (PAA) (Colombetti 2014) and the extended 
emotions theory (EET) (Krueger 2014, Slaby 2014, Candiotto 2015, Carter et al. 2016) stand 
out for their capacity to combine a well-defined theoretical account of the mind with the 
phenomenology of affectivity and the empirical works coming from cognitive science and 
neuroscience. Moreover, they envisage extending their scope of applicability to other fields 
of research, such as social psychology, sociology and technology. PAA and EET come from 
two different approaches to the mind – notably, active externalism and enactivism – but 
they have in common the recognition of the constitutive value of the environment for the 
realization of cognition as affectivity. In this paper, I will discuss these approaches in detail 
in order to propose a novel account of “extended affectivity” (EA) as the cognition of primary 
intersubjectivity (EACPI). Affectivity is the most primitive way in which the subject knows 
the environment in which she/he is embedded, and the first dynamic practice to constitute a 
“world in common” (Nancy 2002).    
It is possible to analyse contemporary trends in the theory of emotions by dividing them into 
three broad groups which are not, naturally, exhaustive and fine-grained (cf. Candiotto 2016a). 
The first approach is cognitivism. In the philosophy of emotion, cognitivism assumes the 
propositional attitude identity thesis. This thesis states that emotions are identical to 
propositions, or in its weaker form, the thesis maintains that emotions involve propositional 
attitudes. The specific judgement made by emotions is defined as “appraisal”, i.e. a judgement 
of value. The propositional attitude identity thesis derives from a critique of (1) feeling-
centered approaches to emotions, which conceptualise emotions as bodily feelings, (2) 
and behaviourist programs, which are understood as inadequate to fully explain emotions’ 
intentionality.
In contrast, within the cognitive framework, emotions are understood as occurrent states of 
mind with a specific intentionality. They are different from moods, which are occurent states 
1  This paper arises from the project “Emotions First”, funded by the EU (Marie Curie Individual Research Fellowship, 
grant number: 655143), I’m carrying on at the Eidyn Research Centre of the University of Edinburgh. I would thank 
those with whom I had the opportunity to discuss my approach, in particular Adam J. Carter, Jessica MacLaren, and 
Dory Scaltsas for their insightful comments.
Introduction
1. Contemporary 
trends in the 
theory of emotions 
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but with a general intentionality, and from sentiments and traits as dispositional states. 
Appraisal is also central to the second approach, the perceptual model. In this model, emotions 
are types of perceptions, and as perceptions are related to judgment about the empirical 
word, emotions are therefore related to moral judgments (Goldie 2007, Sauer 2012). As the 
standard cognitive approach, the perceptual model emphasizes the “feeling towards”, i. e. the 
intentional character of emotions, making a comparison between emotions and perceptions: 
just like perceptions, emotions overcome themselves in order to reach the object they are for. 
For this model, emotions “need not consist in articulated propositions” (De Sousa 2014: 19) 
and, thus, the non conceptual apprehension of the world of beasts and babies (cf. Deigh 1994) 
is comprehended by binding emotions with desires.
The third group is the most multifaceted and comprises approaches that identify emotions 
with bodily experience or that stress the strong value of body experience in the emotional 
arousal. Even if these approaches have some peculiar traits creating particular differences 
among them, one could still highlight the common rejection of the standard assumption 
that cognition is instantiated “centrally” by the brain only. Broadly speaking, in this third 
category we could count those approaches as emanating from Continental philosophy, mainly 
from phenomenology, existentialism and women’s philosophy. Arguably, William James may 
be seen as one of the founders of this varied family of approaches, since for him emotions 
are bodily feelings. In the apprehension of reality the bodily feeling comes first, and then 
the judgment of experience follows. Physiological changes precede emotions that are the 
subjective experience of body changes (James 1950: 173).
Outside of these three broad groups, there are many other contemporary approaches to 
emotions theory. Most notable are multidisciplinary approaches that combine different 
disciplines such as psychology, cognitive science, philosophy, epistemology, anthropology, 
sociology, biology and neuroscience. These approaches have the aim of providing a broader 
and more comprehensive model for understanding emotions. Usually, these approaches frame 
emotional experiences within a broader cognitive environment and can be similar to the 
second or the third group, or even offer a novel approach to a reformatted cognitivism.
The frameworks of the two approaches I discuss in this paper, i.e. enactivism and the extended 
mind hypothesis, appertain exactly to this novel and diversified multidisciplinary context.
Enactivism (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991; Thompson 2007), by underlying the continuity 
between mind and nature, creates the grounds for embodied and embedded cognition. The 
extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998), by focusing on the cognitive valence of 
external tools, enlightens the mutual cognitive actions inside an extended cognitive system. 
Both assume a critical stance towards internalism, arguing for an active externalism where 
cognitive agents constitute themselves in relation to the environment whilst perception/
cognition are active forces of the sense making. 
Enactivism and the extended mind hypothesis were chosen as frameworks by two very 
promising and novel hypotheses in affective science and philosophy of emotions discussed 
in detail below, the Primordial Affectivity Approach (PAA) and the Extended Emotions Thesis 
(EET).
PAA represents the theoretical model for a very detailed analysis of enactive affectivity 
delivered by Colombetti in connection with the new results coming from affective science. 
PAA grounds the comprehension of emotions in an account of the mind that emphasizes its 
embodied and affective character, understanding affectivity as the primordial way in which an 
organism understands, decides and acts in a particular environment. Criticizing the standard 
conception of cognitive science that understands emotions and moods as transitional state 
of minds (emotions very quick, moods longer), Colombetti comprehends the mind as always 
2. Primordial 
Affectivity 
and Extended 
Emotions
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affective in its origin, since affectivity is understood as the structural pattern in which every 
form of life produces itself and its world. Emotional events are expressions of the whole living 
organism embedded in the world. Thus, PAA is a dynamic systems approach to affectivity, 
in which sense-making is the leading notion for understanding the affective structural 
relationship which all living systems have with the environment. For Colombetti, saying that 
affectivity is primordial means that it pertains to all living beings – including those without a 
neural system – because affectivity is enacted by the whole organism. In this way she strongly 
criticizes the mainstream neuro-centric thinking about mind in general, and emotions in 
particular.
EET is understood in different ways. Joel Krueger (2014) discusses the hypothesis of the 
“environmentally extended emotions” for which there are cases in which the emotions 
extend the body boundaries and are constituted by external factors. As it was well noticed 
by Achim Stephan, Sven Walter, and Wendy Wilutzky (2014), not all influences performed by 
the environment might be understood as extension. On the contrary, two very specific traits 
should be present – at least in the orthodox version of the extended mind hypothesis – the 
internal representations and the active structuring of the environment. External factors may 
also be represented by other human beings – i.e. not only in technological tools – and, thus, 
Jan Slaby (2014) understands “extended emotions” as a case of “collective emotions”, or with 
Krueger’s words as “collectively extended emotions”, within the so-called “third wave” of 
the extended cognition. Emotions should be intended both as emotions that are “common” 
among the members of a group, and as emotions that are constituted by all the members of a 
group at the same time, developing what Slaby calls “the political philosophy of mind”, i.e. the 
situated and engaged stance in the philosophy of mind not restricted to abstract theoretical 
investigations. 
Following Slaby’s conceptualization of EET, Candiotto (2015) stresses how the mind’s extension 
is not only a question of location but also of determining the type of knowledge that is 
realized: such knowledge is not just “shared” within a group, but it is also extended in the 
sense of enhanced or maximized by a collective inquiry. In this precise aspect, this formulation 
of EET found in the Adam Carter, Emma Gordon and Orestis Palermos’ approach a common 
root. Their goal is to understand EET as a novel application of the hypothesis of extended 
cognition (HEC), i.e. the claim that some cognition extends beyond skin and skull to parts of 
the external world. Carter et al argue for a fruitful combination between HEC and cognitivist 
approaches to emotion. According to this approach, the cognitions on which emotions 
supervene are dynamic and extended processes.
The common ground between these two approaches is represented by the general view of an 
embodied, situated and environmentally active mind. 
Colombetti and Slaby subscribe to the idea of an affective intentionality, probably because of 
their common phenomenological roots (the Merleau-Pontyian lived body) and Slaby’s notion 
of “interactive coupling” (“the continuous interaction with some expressive environmental 
structure”, Slaby 2014: 37) makes his formulation of EET as enactive (his motto is “enaction 
rules extension”), exactly as Colombetti does, merging “primordial affectivity” and “sense 
making”. 
Phenomenology and enactivism are not explicitly considered in the extended mind 
hypothesis2 and in the more orthodox formulation of extended emotions by Carter et al, which 
2  Andy Clark (1997) is one of the founder of the model of embodied cognition and he dealt with the embodied mind 
and enactivism throughout the years (cf. Clark 2016). Therefore, this division should not be understood rigidly.
3. Primordial 
affectivity cum 
and versus 
extended 
emotions
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are framed by novel discoveries in the cognitive science field. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that they are incompatible, since scientific discoveries could provide evidence of our 
phenomenological experiences, and conversely, our phenomenological experiences could 
stimulate new scientific research bringing them new intuitions. Therefore, Slaby discusses 
the extended mind hypothesis – he undertakes the “integrationist” second wave approach 
of Menary (2010) and not the parity principle of Clark and Chalmers (1998) – and one of 
Colombetti’s main goal is to bring the philosophical idea of primordial affectivity to the 
contemporary debate in affective science, and so to shape primordial affectivity into scientific 
results. In particular, Colombetti (2013) advances the “neuro-physio-phenomenology” for 
the scientific study of emotion experience, combining phenomenological first-person data 
about emotional feelings and third-person data about mind and body activity. Thus, from a 
methodological point of view, it is possible to underline the common effort of PAA and EET 
to overcome the division between humanistic and scientific research, as in the case for many 
contemporary philosophical researches that embrace the idea of a naturalized philosophy. 
Both PPA and EET reject psychological internalism or mentalism, and understand appraisal 
as constituted by the activity of the whole situated organism. For PPA it is not possible to 
distinguish appraisal from emotion and, following this path, I depict extended emotions as 
epistemic emotions, enlightening the inextricable bond between emotions and cognition, 
starting from the neuroscience account which demonstrates how cognitive and emotional 
functions are so deeply integrated in the brain (Freeman 2000, Lewis 2005). At the same time, it 
is crucial to understand what “constituted by” means within these two models as it is exactly 
in this point that they are arguably very different. I will highlight this by analysing some 
specific contrasts.
First of all I must emphasize that, unlike PAA, EET is not an already well-developed and unified 
theory. Therefore the discussion below may miss some of the specific notions that pertain to 
each single approach within EET
On the one side (Colombetti, Slaby, Candiotto) we find the idea that emotions belong to a 
lived body that acts inside the environment, on the other (Carter et al.) the idea that emotions 
supervene on mental states and that, even if extended in an environment, they pertain mainly 
to the brain activity. In fact, the circularity between brain and external environment (Carter 
et al.’ EET) and enactive coupling are not at all synonymous. In fact, following the standard 
formulation of extended mind by Clark and Chalmers (1998), the circularity between brain 
and environment is understood as causality, for which not only the brain depends on the 
environment but part of the environment constitutes the cognitive activity of the brain. 
Instead of circular causality, enactive coupling points to the inextricable and interdependent 
structural relation between an organism and its environment and cognition is exactly 
understood as the dynamical product of this relation.
According to enactivism, cognition is realized (“enacted”) by the whole living organism 
embedded in the world and so primordial affectivity represents for Colombetti the specific 
relation that every form of life (also the simplest one, as bacteria) has with its environment. 
Thus, affectivity could be understood as the self-organizing pattern of a living organism, 
modelled by the continuous interchange with the environment. Also EET stresses the 
constitutive relation with the environment as source of the emotional experience, but for AAP 
the agents are every living being and for EET not, since it describes the emotional cognition of 
an evoluted human brain and pushes its discoveries to research in artificial intelligence and 
in sociological research about the relations among humans. This does not mean that AAP is 
not interested in the study of humans’ affectivity but that its account on the more complex 
emotional experiences of the humans are framed into the basic structure of life and are 
understood as highly integrated configuration of the same process of self-organisation. 
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As I have explained above, for AAP affectivity pervades the mind, it is not just an occurrent 
state of a “neutral” mind. EET, on the contrary, assumes the standard cognitive analysis of 
emotions as occurrent state of minds and so extended emotions are the very specific and 
temporally determined states of mind that are realized just in the very determined conditions 
of the cognitive integration with the environment. This does not mean that EET is less 
extreme than AAP: in fact, EET claims that emotions overcome the feeling body since extended 
emotions are beyond the brain and the body. I think that AAP could not accept this conclusion 
since it frames affectivity exactly as structure of a body. Even if in the conclusion of her book 
(2014, chapter 7) Colombetti has asserted that enactive emotions do not deny relationship 
with others, she has nevertheless mainly described them from the perspective of an individual 
organism. She has not argued for interrelatedness or intersubjectivity as primitive (see par. 4 
for my thesis about it).
The last point of difference I would underline has to do with the metaphysical assumption 
undertaken (explicitly or implicitly) by the two approaches. Even if EET claims to be 
metaphysical neutral (a functionalist approach), I think that it is possible to detect in it 
a realist approach, broadly speaking, both ontic and epistemic. On the contrary, for PAA 
it becomes meaningless to speak about “internal world” and “external world” since the 
action is realized (enacted) in a fully integrated environment understood as the whole. For 
AAP cognition is a form of interpretation, while in contrast, EET struggles for an objective 
knowledge framed by the results of science. Therefore, it is notable that the different 
premises of the two approaches, a functionalist cognitivism even reformed, and continental 
phenomenology combined with enactivism, have a strong impact in AAP and EET, making 
them very dissimilar despite having in common the critiques of internalism and the 
valorization of the structural relation with the environment. In the meantime, we should not 
assume their incompatibility.
Arguably, it is fruitful to combine the core idea of PAA, i.e. the understanding of affectivity 
as the whole experience of a living body, with the EET claim about extended cognition, in 
order to achieve the novel notion of “extended affectivity” (EA). With EA, extended cognition 
is not only the extension of mental states but the cognition of the entire living body, where 
the whole of an individual’s experience is framed within intersubjectivity, understood as 
primitive. EA poses a lot of challenges to PAA and EET, in particular to PAA to dismiss the 
notion of complete autonomy of the living organism, while EET is challenged to be open to 
wider horizons of inquiry connected to the idea of the extended consciousness (Noë 2004, 
2010) and to a more liberal interpretation – as it is defined by its proponent – of the extended 
mind hypothesis, i.e. the “socially extended mind” (Gallagher 2013), or third wave. At the same 
time EA recognizes its debit to both PAA and EET, in particular the constitutional relationship 
with the environment benefits from the results of PAA, as with the notion of cognitive 
extension from EET. Thus, my constructive motto is to combine the benefits whilst reducing 
the limits of the two, with the purpose to propose a new approach that will not merely be a 
sum of the two, but it would even recognize the strong dependency between them. 
To clarify: the strength I would take from EET is the core idea of extension and from PAA the 
critique to reduce affectivity to an “emotional occurrent event”. The area I would improve is 
the social and intersubjective dimension of the extension, focusing not only on the extension 
in technological tools but developing the idea of primordial affectivity within intersubjectivity 
as primitive.
EA is not a totally novel conception since it has to do with the philosophical ideas coming from 
phenomenology and existentialism that the experience is always shared and mutual and that 
agency is understandable as “we-intentionality”, and from social ontology and epistemology 
4. Extended 
affectivity 
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where the “we” is the main indicator of social action, which implies a “plural subject” and not 
a simple sum of two or more individuals (Gilbert 1989). In the meantime, the word “extended 
affectivity” starts to be detectable in few very new articles (Colombetti 2015, Fuchs & Koch 
2014) on philosophy of emotions. Nevertheless, the novelty of my account consists in the 
recognition of the protocognitive valence of the affectivity through the conceptualization of 
social developmental and psychological researches. I simultaneously point to the necessity of 
describing “affectivity” as this specific protocognitive ability, overcoming the dualism between 
cognitive and non-cognitive mental states, and also to recognize intersubjectivity as primitive.
I assume the notion of EA as the cognition of primary intersubjectivity (EACPI). Much has 
been done in primary intersubjectivity, especially by social and developmental psychology. 
Specifically, using the notion of “primary intersubjectivity”, I am referring to the pioneer work 
of Colwin Trevarthen (Trevarthen 1979, Trevarthen 2011), who has demonstrated the leading 
role of affectivity in the neonatal intersubjectivity (but also in the belly!) in neurobiology.
[…] they show themselves capable of making an effort of will and attentiveness to take 
part in an emotionally charged reciprocation of arbitrary ways of moving, and so to 
become part of a dramatic narration of being in companionship with another person. 
(Trevarthen 2011: 124)
Joel Krueger (2013) has already underlined how the physical interventions caregivers use 
to regulate infant attention and emotion are part of the infant’s socially extended mind; in 
my opinion the best goals that Krueger’s paper has attained were to have stressed how the 
cultural norms are mediated by the body actions and, in the meantime, to have underlined the 
key role performed by the body in the cognitive development. 
The best example of EACPI is the mutual relationship between a mother and her infant (see 
par. 4.2). Nevertheless, following Shaun Gallagher (2001)3, I do not think that EACPI pertains 
only to mothers and infants but that continues to be active in all social animals at all life 
stages, as the primordial source of intersubjectivity. 
Krueger (2014) has underlined that collective extended emotions are easily detected in 
infancy, but hardly in adults – even if he provides some examples from music and dance – for 
which the notion of “individual extended emotions” is more useful, i.e. the recognition of the 
constitutive role of external factors for the individual emotional arousal. On this point my 
approach to EA would underline that, even if adults’ “individual extended emotions” are more 
prominent, this does not mean that the collective stance may be not at work on the back as 
primordial source of intersubjectivity. With the development of the cognitive skills, primary 
intersubjectivity will be combined with the secondary and the tertiary intersubjectivity but 
its role cannot be denied in the adults intersubjectivity, especially regarding the researches 
on empathy. Anya Doly (2014) claims that primary intersubjectivity is the empathic 
responsiveness to the others4. Following this path, I assert that primary intersubjectivity plays 
in the background in adults, and has an extraordinary role in our mutual desire to constitute a 
“world in common” (Nancy 2002). 
The biological constitution of intersubjectivity, in the meantime, should be combined with 
3  “Primary, embodied intersubjectivity is not primary simply in developmental terms. Rather, it remains primary 
across all face-to-face intersubjective experiences,[...]”. Gallagher 2001: 91.
4  “Primary empathy is affective reversibility, which renders us susceptible to another’s gaze, to their voice, to their 
touch.” Daly 2014: 237.
4.1. Primary 
intersubjectivity
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the recognition of the first-person experience. Regarding HEC, Orestis Palermos and Duncan 
Pritchard (Palermos & Pritchard 2013) designed a model that seeks to avoid of the extremism 
of conceptualization of knowledge as realized only “inside” or “outside” the boundaries of 
the skin. To achieve it, they combine research on virtue epistemology with the distributive 
cognition framework for group knowledge, valorizing the specific cognitive skills of every 
agent in the distributed process. Even if they do not explicitly take emotions into account in 
their model, I do think that it is a very useful way of understanding the peculiar interweaving 
between collective and first-person affective experience. In my opinion the distributive 
cognition hypothesis might strengthen the intersubjectivity vision of emotions for which the 
emotional embodied experience of a subject is not only affected by but also strengthened by 
the relationships with others. Emotions are not private state of minds but active and dynamic 
processes between subjects. They are the forthcoming of our active interaction with the 
world, clarifying how the regulation of the self always involves the others, and without losing 
the ontological status of the subject. Understanding EA for adults within this framework 
permits to achieve the notion of “distributed affectivity” (DA), i.e. this specific affective state 
of the group, and of its single components. Arguably, DA may develop the idea of collectively 
extended emotions without neglecting their first-personal character. 
Let analyze in details our key case of EACPI. We should notice how the mother and the fetus5, 
and then the infant, are bound together by a constitutive relation moved by the biological 
needs of survival and development. They form a group (“common intercorporality”, Fuchs & 
De Jaegher 2009) understandable as a single entity or as a systemic dyad in its developmental 
goals. For the infant this relationship is constitutive of her/his growth in terms of evolutions, 
adaptations and survival in a specified environment. The affective relation between mother 
and infant, established in the repeated actions of care performed by the mother, builds the 
protocognition of the infant. As Trevarthen has demonstrated, infants are born with a natural 
propensity to intersubjectivity, 
[…] with motives and emotions for actions that sustain human intersubjectivity. […]. 
Their Intelligence is prepared to grow and be educated by sharing the meaning of 
intentions and feelings with other humans by means of many expressive forms of body 
movement that may be perceived in several modalities. (Trevarthen 2011: 121).
They are constitutively bound together not only for biological reasons – think of the 
expression “you are the blood of my veins, you are bone of my bone” – but also for social 
reasons. Intelligence has evolved in social animals for actions to be shared socially6. It is 
well known that the symbiotic relations between a mother and infant could also become 
pathological for the mother (cf. for example the depression post partum) and for the 
development of the infant’s autonomy; nevertheless, it is in its good performance that the 
infant learns to be a social being.
Arguably, the constitutive “use” of the mother by the infant as a source of care, nutrition, 
etc. makes their relationship a case of extended affectivity as extended protocognition. 
The constitutive relation with the mother constitutes the affectivity of the infant and some 
5  I’m referring here to the natural mother and not to unspecified caregivers to stress the biological link at work. 
Nevertheless, doing so I do not deny the possibility to detect these characteristics also in relations to other caregivers, 
in particular understanding the crucial role performed by the social practices towards our biological patterns.
6  “The creative output of natural intelligence in moving animal bodies, its conation and emotion”, Trevarthen 2011: 
122.
4.2. The 
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protocognitive states arise exactly in this process on “interbodily resonance” (Fuchs & Koach 
2014). The love and care of the mother for the infant bounces back to the infant producing 
not only attachment but also a feeling of affection for her/his source of survival and, thus, 
a protocognition of intersubjectivity as relational knowing. Claiming that what is extended 
is affectivity means that this extension is not occasional and momentary7 (as would be if 
what is extended was just emotion as an occurrent state of mind) and not necessary moved 
by representations (as cognitions). This kind of extension is existential and constitutes the 
subject as “being with” (Nancy 1996, Candiotto 2016b). As Trevarthen has claimed, the self-
regulation is alteroceptive8. Affectivity is the more primitive way in which the subject is open 
to the others and constitutes itself as “being with”, and the primordial intersubjectivity is the 
source for protocognition as affectivity.
Having discussed PAA and EET and having provided some very specific points of difference 
between them, I introduced my approach of extended affectivity as primary intersubjectivity 
(EACPI), arguing for the protocognitive value of affectivity. Moreover, I explained why the 
distributed cognition model is the more convenient to understand, at the same time, the 
collective and the subjective dimension of EA. 
I think that this topic is both intriguing and tricky and that further investigations are required, 
especially regarding the elaborations of replies to the critics of the representationalists 
for whom, since cognition is representation, it cannot be performed within primary 
intersubjectivity. Although more work is required in this field of research, it seems fair to 
conclude that one reply may arise from an analysis of the embodied access to intersubjectivity 
as protocognitive and of the primordial empathic responsiveness. 
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